Quantum private information retrieval (QPIR) is the problem to retrieve one of f classical files by downloading quantum systems from non-communicating n servers each of which contains the copy of f files, while the identity of the retrieved file is unknown to each server. As an extension, we consider the (n−1)-private QPIR that the identity of the retrieved file is secret even if any n−1 servers collude, and derive the QPIR capacity for this problem which is defined as the maximum rate of the retrieved file size over the download size. For an even number n of servers, we show that the capacity of the (n−1)-private QPIR is 2/n, when we assume that there are preexisting entanglements among the servers and require that no information of the nonretrieved files is downloaded. We construct an (n − 1)-private QPIR protocol of rate n/2 −1 and prove that the capacity is upper bounded by 2/n. The (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity is strictly greater than the classical counterpart. The full version of this paper is accessible at: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.12556. * n, f, and t: the number of servers, files, and colluding servers, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
A private information retrieval (PIR) protocol is a protocol that a user retrieves a file from servers without revealing the identity of the retrieved file. Since it was first proposed by the paper [1] , it has been studied in classical settings [2] - [6] and quantum settings [7] - [11] . Especially, in the last few years of classical PIR (CPIR) studies, the PIR capacity has been extensively studied, which is the maximum rate of the retrieved file size over the download size when the file size is arbitrarily large and the upload size, i.e., the total size of queries, is negligible to the download size. The paper [12] derived the CPIR capacity for the most trivial setting that each server contains the replicated file set. Several CPIR capacities have been derived (see Table I ), e.g., the capacity when some servers may collude [13] and the capacity when the file set is coded and distributed to the servers [14] . Moreover, many other papers [15] - [22] have studied the CPIR capacity and the capacity-achieving protocols.
As a quantum extension of the CPIR capacity in [12] , the paper [23] proved that the quantum PIR (QPIR) capacity is 1 for the replicated servers without collusion. The above QPIR capacity is strictly greater than the classical counterpart. However, it still needs to be clarified whether QPIRs in other settings have advantages over the CPIR counterparts in the sense of the PIR capacities. For instance, in the PIR for n replicated servers where each server contains f files and any t servers may collude (t-private PIR), the CPIR capacity is (1 − t/n)/ 1−(t/n) f [13] but the QPIR capacity is unknown. Replicated servers with collusion
1 [23] In this paper, we prove the (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity is 2/n for any even number n. By extending the QPIR protocol [23] with the idea of the entanglement swapping [26] , for any integer n ≥ 1, we construct an (n − 1)-private QPIR protocol with the rate n/2 −1 , no error, and the perfect secrecy. We prove the strong converse bound that the (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity with the perfect secrecy is upper bounded by 2/n even if we allow any asymptotic error probability less than 1. Since the (n − 1)-private CPIR capacity for the infinite number of files is 1/n, our QPIR capacity implies the quantum advantage in PIR with colluding servers.
Our (n − 1)-private QPIR protocol has several remarkable properties. First of all, our protocol can be considered as a (distributed) oblivious transfer protocol [24] , [25] because our protocol guarantees the server secrecy, i.e., no file information other than the retrieving one is transmitted to the user. Second, the upload cost of our protocol is nf bits, which is linear for the number n of servers and the number f of files but independent of the file size m. Third, our protocol requires the file size m = 2 2 , i.e., 2 bits, for any positive integer , whereas the (n − 1)-private CPIR protocol in [13] requires the file size m = q n f depending on n and f for a sufficiently large prime power q.
Section II defines the QPIR protocol and presents our main theorems for the (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity. Section III is preliminaries for the protocol construction and Section IV constructs the QPIR protocol with n − 1 colluding servers. Section V proves the strong converse bound when the perfect server and user secrecy is guaranteed. User Query Index: K ∈ {1, . . . , f}
Colluding Servers 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we review the QPIR protocol given in the paper [23] , which is defined in the same way for the (n − 1)private QPIR except for the security parameters. Then, we present two main theorems for the (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity.
A. Description of QPIR Protocol
Let W 1 , . . . , W f be uniformly and independently distributed in {0, . . . , m − 1}. Each of non-communicating n servers serv 1 , . . . , serv n contains the replicated f-file set W := (W 1 , . . . , W f ). In addition, each server serv t contains a quantum system A 0 t and the n servers share an arbitrary entangled state ρ prev on A 0 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A 0 n . The aim of the QPIR protocol is that a user chooses a uniformly distributed query index K ∈ {1, . . . , f} and retrieves the file W K from the servers.
For this purpose, the user and the servers perform the following process. First, the user chooses a random variable R user from a set R user and encodes the queries Q 1 , . . . , Q n by the user encoder Enc user as follows:
where Q t for any t ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a finite set for describing possible query indexes to the server serv t . Then, for any t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, each query Q t is sent to the server serv t . After receiving the query Q t , each server serv t prepares a tracepreserving and completely positive (TP-CP) map Λ t from A 0 t to A t by the server encoder Enc servt , i.e., Enc servt (Q t , W ) = Λ t and the resultant state on A :
Then, each server serv t sends A t to the user. The user finally retrieves the querying file W K by the decoder Dec(K, Q) defined as follows:
which depends on the query index K and the query Q. By applying the positive-operator valued measurement (POVM)
i=0 Y i corresponds to the decoding failure, the user takes the measurement outcomê
Given the number n of servers and the number f of files, a QPIR protocol is defined by the four-tuple
where Enc serv := (Enc serv1 , . . . , Enc servn ). Note that the QPIR protocol Φ 
.
B. Security Parameters and Capacity for (n−1)-private QPIR
We define the security parameters and the capacity of the (n − 1)-private QPIR when any n − 1 servers may collude to reveal the identity K of the retrieved file W K .
1) Security Parameters: We have three security parameters for a QPIR protocol with colluding servers: the error parameter, the server secrecy parameter, and the user secrecy parameter.
The error parameter α(Φ (m) QPIR ) is defined by the smallest real number such that
is the average error probability of the protocol.
The server and user secrecy parameters β(Φ 
where Q t is the collection of queries to all servers other than serv t .
2) (n−1)-private QPIR Capacity: The (n−1)-private QPIR capacity is defined with the security and upload constraints.
For any α, β, γ, θ ≥ 0, the asymptotic and exact securityconstrained (n − 1)-private QPIR capacities are defined by
where the supremum is taken for sequences {m } ∞ =1 such that lim →∞ m = ∞ and sequences {Ψ
C. Main Results
Two main theorems of the paper are as follows.
Theorem II.1. For the (n − 1)-private QPIR with any n ≥ 2 servers and f ≥ 2 files where the collection of any n − 1 servers may collude, there exists a QPIR protocol with the rate n/2 −1 , zero security parameters, nf-bit upload cost, and 2 -bit files for any integer ≥ 1.
Section IV constructs the protocol that achieves the performance given in Theorem II.1. When n = 2, the protocol in Section IV corresponds to the protocol in [23] .
Theorem II.2 (Capacity of (n − 1)-private QPIR). For the (n − 1)-private QPIR with any n ≥ 2 servers and f ≥ 2 files where the collection of any n − 1 servers may collude, the QPIR capacity is evaluated as
C α,0,0,θ asymp ≤ 2 n (4)
for any α ∈ [0, 1) and β, γ, θ ≥ 0.
The last inequality in (3) follows from Theorem II.1 and the inequality (4) will be proved in Section V.
III. PRELIMINARIES FOR PROTOCOL CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we give preliminaries on quantum operations and measurements, and prepare a simple protocol to describe our QPIR protocol. These operations satisfy the relations
A. Preliminaries on States, Operations, and Measurements
For any matrix T = 1 i,j=0 t ij |i j| on A, we define the vector |T in A ⊗ A by |T := 1 i,j=0 t ij |i ⊗ |j . With this notation, the maximally entangled state is written as |Φ
For the maximally entangled state |Φ on A ⊗ A, the Pauli operation A(a, b) on the first (second) qubit can be translated to the operation A(−a, −b) on the second (first) qubit:
The following proposition is a case of [23, Proposition III.1] for qubits.
Proposition III.1. The set
is an orthonormal basis of A ⊗ A.
From Proposition III.1, we can define the PVM
B. Two-Sum Transmission Protocol
Consider there are three parties Alice, Bob, and Carol. By the following protocol, Carol receives the sum of Alice's information (a, b) ∈ Z 2 2 and Bob's information (c, d) ∈ Z 2 2 . Protocol III.1. Suppose that Alice and Bob possess qubits A 1 and A 2 , respectively, and share |Φ ∈ A 1 ⊗ A 2 . The two-sum transmission protocol is given as follows.
Step 1 Alice and Bob apply A(−a, −b) on A 1 and A(c, d) on A 2 , respectively. Step 2 Alice and Bob send the quantum systems A 1 and A 2 to Carol, respectively.
Step 3 Carol performs the PVM M Z 2 and obtains the measurement outcome (e, f ) as the protocol output.
In Protocol III.1, the output (e, f ) is (a + c, b + d), which can be proved trivially from (6) and (9) . The protocol requires two-qubit transmission each from Alice and Bob.
IV. QPIR PROTOCOL WITH n − 1 COLLUDING SERVERS In this section, we propose a QPIR protocol that achieves the performance given in Theorem II.1 for any n ≥ 2 servers.
Assume that each server contains the following file set. Given two arbitrary integers ≥ 1 and f ≥ 2, the file set is given by the collection of 2 -bit files W 1 , . . . , W f ∈ Z 2 2 and W i for any i ∈ {1, . . . , f} is denoted by
2 ) × . Our protocol for n servers is described as follows. 1) Preparation: For each p ∈ {1, . . . , }, prepare the following quantum systems and states.
The servers serv 1 and serv n have qubits A (p) 1
and A (p) n , respectively. For each t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, the server serv t has three qubits A 2) Upload Step: Choose Q 1 , . . . , Q n−1 from the power set 2 {1,...,f} independently and uniform randomly. Define Q n by
The user sends the query Q t to serv t for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3) Download
Step: For each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, depending on the query Q t , the server serv t calculates
Then, for each p ∈ {1, . . . , }, the servers perform the following process.
a) The server serv 1 (serv n ) applies A(−H (p)
n ) and transmits A 
4) Retrieval
Step: For each p ∈ {1, . . . , }, the user performs the following process. a) For any j ∈ {1, . . . , n/2 − 1}, the user receives the sum G
n whose measurement outcome is denoted byŴ 
t,2 ) of serv t . As shown in [27, Appendix A] , at the end of Download
Step, the state on A
where φ
n−1 . Then, at the end of Retrieval Step b), the state on A
n−1 . Thus, at Retrieval Step c), the measurement outcome isŴ
2 , which implies that our protocol correctly retrieves W K .
2) Secrecy: The user secrecy is obtained because the collection of any n − 1 variables in Q 1 , . . . , Q n is independent of the query index K.
Consider the server secrecy. The user obtains W K and G (p) 2j + G (p) 2j+1 for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n/2 − 1} and any p ∈ {1, . . . , }. If n is odd, the user obtains G (p) n−1 additionally. Note that before the measurement of the server serv t for any t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, the state on A L,(p) t ⊗ A R,(p) t is the completely mixed state, which implies that the measurement outcomes G (p) t for all t are mutually independent and independent of any file. Therefore, the user obtains no file information other than W K .
3) Costs and Rate: The upload cost is nf bits because each of Q 1 , . . . , Q n is written by f bits. For each p ∈ {1, . . . , }, the user downloads A additionally if n is odd. Therefore, the download cost is n qubits when n is even, and (n + 1) qubits when n is odd. The file size is 2 bits, i.e., m = 2 2 . Therefore, the QPIR rate is
Moreover, the sequence {Ψ (m ) QPIR } ∞ =1 of our protocols for m := 2 2 achieves the negligible upload cost with respect to the download cost, i.e., lim →∞ nf n = lim →∞ nf (n + 1) = 0.
V. CONVERSE
In this section, we prove the converse bound (4) for any α ∈ [0, 1), θ ≥ 0.
For any t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, recall that Q t is the collection of queries to all servers other than serv t . Let A t be the composite system of all servers other than serv t and ρ t|k be the state on A t after the server encoding. Let d t and d t be the dimensions of A t and A t , respectively.
We prepare the following lemma. The converse is proved as follows. Assume that β(Φ (m) QPIR ) = 0 and γ(Φ (m) QPIR ) = 0. We consider the case K = k. Let ρ w,z be the quantum state on the composite system n i=1 A i , where w is the file to be retrieved and z := (w c , q) for the collection w c of other f − 1 files and the collection q of queries. The entire system A is given as a bipartite system A = A t ⊗ A t . Since Lemma V.1 guarantees that the reduced density ρ w,z on A t does not depend on w, we denote it by ρ z . Applying [28, (4.66) ] to the choice σ z = ρ z ⊗ I At /d t , we have 
for any r ∈ (0, 1). The last inequality of (15) follows from [27, Eq. (25) ]. Given a sequence of QPIR protocols {Ψ (m )
has the QPIR rate greater than 2/n for any sufficiently large , (D(Ψ (m ) QPIR )) 2/n /m goes to 0. Since (D(Ψ (m ) QPIR )) 2/n /m ≥ (min t dim A t ) 2 /m , the inequality (15) implies that the probability 1 − P err (Ψ (m ) QPIR ) approaches to 0. Therefore, (4) is proved.
